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Abstract 
This paper is motivated by the fact that (part-time) individual farming is commonly observed 
among rural households in a number of transition economies but it is not clear prima facie if 
such resource allocation is optimal.  A conceptual model of household labor allocation 
between individual farming and off-farm wage employment is developed.  The model 
explicitly accounts for the role of household endowments in labor allocation as the analysis is 
conditioned on the status of factor markets.  The hypotheses are empirically tested using 1998 
data from a country-representative survey of rural households in Hungary, an advanced 
transition country, which only recently became EU member state.  Results provide evidence 
that capital market imperfections still remain.  Implications for the policies related to 
agricultural sector restructuring, employment and rural development are discussed.  
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INDIVIDUAL FARMING IN THE NEW EU MEMBER STATES:  




The process of international integration in Europe has resulted in the most significant 
expansion in the history of the European Union (EU).  Hungary and seven other advanced 
transition economies (TEs) became members of the EU and thus joined the group of 
peripheral member states characterized by relatively large rural populations and importance 
of the agricultural sector.  As with incumbent peripheral EU members, a number of measures 
related to market liberalization and rural development need to be designed and implemented 
in the new member states (NMS) so that appropriate structural funds could be allocated and 
efficiently utilized.  Furthermore, to the extent that market failures and deficiency of 
endowments could prevent rural households from efficiently using their resources, policies 
that improve this situation would play an important role to maximize the gains associated 
with agricultural sector restructuring and the emergence of new individual farms in TEs.  
Trends and changes in both urban and rural sectors of TEs since 1990 have resulted in 
a set of economic and social conditions that strongly affected the attractiveness of both rural 
and urban areas as places to live and work, and consequently the labor reallocation and rural–
urban migration.  Industrial downsizing and the high cost of living have reduced the 
opportunities in the urban labor markets, while whole new service industries, the 
development of a managerial upper class, and new suburban housing have contributed to 
retaining or attracting the highly skilled categories of the labor force.  Agricultural 
restructuring and declining availability of social services are rural push factors reducing the 
opportunities in the rural labor markets, but the low cost of living, possibilities for self-  2
provisioning, available housing, and social network ties have attracted dislocated urban 
workers and retained longer-term rural residents.  Parallel to dissolving or reorganizing large 
production co-operatives, the numbers of small individual farms have grown being often a 
part-time activity and a means of subsistence of the rural population.  A feature of 
employment in agriculture is often underemployment and hidden unemployment (Lewis, 
1954; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Deininger and Olinto, 2001).  This hidden and sometimes 
highly localized underemployment is reflected only inadequately, if at all, by basic indicators 
such as unemployment rates and deserves a more thorough investigation.  
Our analysis based on household production model, casts light on the labor allocation 
and income diversification decisions of rural households in TEs using the case of Hungary as 
illustration.  In this context, the characteristics influencing household’s employment 
opportunities and ability to shift resources to and manage individual farm are studied with an 
emphasis on the role of household endowments.  The hypotheses are empirically tested using 
1998 country-representative household survey data from rural Hungary.  Results of the 
analysis have potentially important implications for the policies related to agricultural sector 
restructuring, employment programs and generally for efficient resource allocation in TEs.   
The paper also contributes to the understanding of the nature of and factors affecting 
rural households’ income diversification through combining farming with off-farm wage 
occupations a pattern most commonly observed in TEs (Chaplin, Davidova, and Gorton, 
2004).  Such analysis is important as in recent years attempts have been made to transpose 
West European model of agricultural diversification to the associated countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe under the EU’s Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (SAPARD).  There also are potentially important rural development and 
welfare implications of the ongoing CAP reforms not only for the existing EU members but   3
for the NMS as well (Rizov, 2004).  Thus the analysis of household labor allocation would 
cast light on the feasibility and the likely outcomes of fully implementing such EU policies.  
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section an overview of “pull” and 
“push” factors affecting resource allocations of rural households in Hungary is presented.  In 
section 3 a simple conceptual model of labor allocation of rural households is set up to 
analyze the observed patterns.  In section 4 the estimation methodology and the variables 
used in regressions are described.  Section 5 reports estimation results and section 6 
concludes the paper by pointing out some policy implications.  
 
2  Pull and push factors in rural Hungary 
Economic reforms in Hungary resulted in deep structural changes affecting agriculture and 
rural areas through a plethora of pull and push factors.  Within a concise time span, resources 
were shifted from co-operative farm organizations to individual farms.  Since 1990, the area 
of individual farms expanded from 12 percent to 54 percent in 1998.  The area of co-
operative farms dramatically fell from 62 percent to 20 percent during the same period.   
Corporate farms stabilized their share in land use at 26 percent (Ferenczi, 1999; Mathijs and 
Varanken, 2004).  
This redistribution of factor use and ownership was guided by a series of 
transformation laws and regulations under which co-operative farms had to transform into 
‘new’ co-operatives, joint-stock companies or individual farms by decision of the assembly 
of members.  In the compensation process individuals could get a considerable part of the co-
operative (34 percent) and state (40 percent) farmland.  Landless members and employees 
also received land allotments in possession (15 percent from co-operative farms and 6 percent   4
from state farms).
1  The share of private ownership averaged about 85 percent of the 
agricultural land, while the state ownership fell to about 15 percent.   
The transformation laws and regulations, by separating employment from 
membership status had important impact on the labor market which resulted in a dramatic 
fall, with almost two thirds, in the official agricultural employment figures (Macours and 
Swinnen, 2000; EBRD, 2002).  In the large successor farm organizations the share of full-
time working members and partners fell to around 30 percent of their labor force.  The share 
of part-time working members and partners became negligible and the share of non-working 
members rose, exceeding 65 percent of the total membership mass.  As a result, full-time 
employees compose the largest proportion in the labor force of co-operative farms and there 
is no significant difference between members or partners and non-member employees, with 
respect to wages.   
Furthermore, economic policies in Hungary inducing comprehensive liberalization of 
prices and hardening of budget constraints resulted in increased labor costs, leading to a 
substantial change in labor market behavior, nationwide.  This change was accommodated by 
rapid liberalization of wage regulations.  Economic agents no longer had any incentive to 
hoard underutilized labor and unemployment rose sharply and even more so in rural areas.  
Many low skilled workers left the formal labor market through early retirement and part-time 
employment schemes (Bilsen and Konings, 1998; Korosi, 1999; Swinnen, Dries, and 
Macours, 2004). 
Under these circumstances, the main alternative to wage employment in rural areas 
had become self-employment in individual farming.  Official Hungarian statistics report that 
during the period of analysis there were 1.2 million farms (holdings larger than 0.15 
hectares), but only about 260 thousand people officially were employed in agriculture.   
                                                 
1 The rest of the land of state farms remained state property with possibility for leasing by individual farmers,   5
Furthermore, the total population of rural areas in Hungary was 2.3 million implying that 
there was one farm for every second inhabitant in the countryside.  These figures suggest the 
presence of a large informal farming sector engaged in by an excess-supply rural labor force 
as a low-return survival (subsistence) strategy, with little prospects for economic 
advancement (Cartwright and Swain, 2002; Kollo, 2001).  
Data from the 1994 and 2000 agricultural censuses in Hungary, however, show a 
declining trend in the number of individual farms, as the decrease has been 20 percent in 
total, for the six-year period.  Important observation is that smaller farm holdings, with size 
below 5 hectares have generated this drop in numbers (with 32 percent) while larger size 
categories, above 5 hectares have shown significant increase in numbers.  In the same time, 
however, the number of units smaller than a farm holding (less than 0.15 hectares) also grew 
quickly as more than 800 thousand mini-plots existed in 2000.  It seems that there is a 
tendency of small farm holdings either shrinking to garden-level cultivation or expanding to 
more viable and larger commercial farms (Rizov and Mathijs, 2003).  
The results from our 1998 country representative rural household survey
2 further 
show that more than 90 percent of the households have allocated some labor in individual 
farms despite that only 8.5 percent are full-time engaged in individual farming.  The average 
household size in the sample is approximately 2 adult members in working age (16-60 years).  
The economic activities of households in the sample are outlined in table 1.   
- Table 1 here - 
Numbers reveal that the vast majority of households are involved in diversity of 
economic activities and that the outcome of this – the total household income - reflects the 
role of allocative decisions in income maximization.  There is no prima facie evidence, 
                                                 
 
for a period up to ten years.     6
however, against the competitive market hypothesis: households engage in both individual 
farming and in off-farm wage employment and the incomes of households engaged in part-
time or full-time farming do not seem to systematically differ.  It is not possible yet to discern 
whether households turn to individual farming for extra employment due to absence of 
opportunities elsewhere or because of higher returns to their endowments.  It is not also clear 
if capital market imperfections prevent households from specializing exclusively in 
individual farming.  
Ferenczi (1999) analyzing the same data has found a sharp upward trend concerning 
labor allocation to individual farming as a function of farm size.  In the category below 5 
hectare, 55 percent of respondents have primary activity outside their farms; in higher farm-
size categories this share is diminishing, down to 15 percent.  In farm-categories above 50 
hectares, respondents do not report any employment outside their individual farms.   
Examining regional data at NUTS-II level
3 shows that the spatial differences in 
measures of labor demand and relative job-finding probabilities also play an important role in 
household labor allocation.  The regions that suffered most during transition were generally 
characterized by a high share of heavy industry or agriculture, poor infrastructure, poorly 
educated labor force, poorly developed services and trade, and relatively large shares of the 
Romany ethnic group among the population.  In 1998, about 40 percent of all unemployed in 
Hungary lived in the economically weak eastern and north-eastern regions while the regions 
with most agricultural character accounted for the highest self-employment rates, especially 
in farming, other things equal (Fazekas and Ozswald, 1998; Kollo, 2001).  
                                                 
 
2 The survey was organized by the Policy Research Group, K.U. Leuven with the financial support of the Phare-
ACE programme of the European Commission.  The sampling methodology and definitions were adopted from 
the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO).  
3 NUTS-II classification level comprises seven regions in Hungary: Central Hungary, North Transdanubia, West 
Transdanubia, South Transdanubia, South Plain, North Plain, and North Hungary (Eurostat, 1999).    7
Central Hungary, including the agglomeration of Budapest, is the most economically 
advanced region.  North Transdanubia, although in many respects similar to North Hungary, 
concentrates more vivid entrepreneurial activities, which bring the region, together with 
South Plain to the top positions in terms of per capita GDP (following Central Hungary).  
North Hungary and North Plain, located in the eastern part of the country, rank among the 
least developed regions with the lowest per capita GDP.  These two regions include many 
rural territories and areas with declining industries.  Agriculture is concentrated mainly in the 
(Great) Plain regions.  In South Plain almost 17 percent of employed work in agriculture, 
while in North Plain and South Transdanubia the share is just over 10 percent (Eurostat, 
1999).   
 
3  Labor allocation - a simple conceptual model 
The household production model (Bertrand and Squire, 1980; Singh, Squire, and Strauss, 
1986) provides an appropriate framework for analyzing labor allocation decisions of rural 
households, facing two main income-generating alternatives: full-time individual farming and 
full-time off-farm wage employment.
4  Third alternative is the part-time individual farming, 
which is a combination of the two activities above and is commonly observed in Hungary as 
well as in other TEs.   
The household income derived from these activities, with output prices normalized to 






T denotes total income, l
T is total labor, a is a vector of (farm) 
capital assets and y
N is unearned income transfer, such as rents and social payments.  Further, 
                                                 
4 For an application of the household production model in transition context see Rizov and Swinnen (2004).  
Note that working in a new co-operative farm, as an employee, is not essentially different from any other wage 
employment (see also section 2).   8
e denotes a vector of household human capital characteristics, which translate into managerial 
ability as well as influence reservation (and market) wages.
5   
In off-farm wage employment, household members can work for a market wage, w 
and earn income: y
W=wl
W, where l
W is wage labor.  Similarly, in the context of Hungary 
households may allocate labor in the new co-operative or corporate farms and work for wages 
there.  
In individual farming households can earn (relatively more risky) income by 




is farm labor input, k  is farm capital input, and other variables are as defined before.
6  
Managerial ability is a fixed factor with which individuals are endowed and for which there is 
no market (Bell and Zusman, 1976).  The impact of managerial ability on the marginal 
products of farm labor and capital is positive (e.g., Huffman, 1980; Fafchamps and 
Quisumbing, 1999).   
The household maximizes a concave joined utility function: u(y
T,l
L), arguments of 
which are total income and leisure, l
L.
7  This is an optimization problem whereby available 
household total time, l is allocated between production and leisure subject to a time 
constraint:  l
L=l-l
T such that l
T=l
W+l








T, where s is staple food, n - non-staple good, and p
S and p
N are staple and non-
staple prices, respectively.  The non-negativity constraints, k≥0, l
F≥0, l
W≥0 have to hold as 
well and all households are assumed to work in at least one activity (l
L<l). 
                                                 
5 Human capital increases productivity in individual farming through its managerial ability effect.  In the same 
time, human capital directly positively affects individual’s employment opportunities (Becker, 1965; Sahn and 
Alderman, 1988; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1993; Yang, 1997).   
6 If markets are missing resources employed in farming will equal household endowments, i.e., k=a.  
Furthermore, because hired labor is not commonly used in individual farms in Hungary as well as in other TEs, 
it is not included in the notation.  Alternatively, it is assumed that household and hired labor are perfect 
substitutes and cost of hiring labor can be accounted for through y
W, which will be negative in the case of net 
hiring of labor.  
7 We do not explicitly consider savings in this static, by nature, model.  Extending the model to include savings 
would complicate the notation without contributing relevant insights.  For example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin   9
Since the household is a price taker, it maximizes utility so that the marginal product 
of labor is set equal to its price, which in turn equals the marginal rate of substitution: 
T L F y l l u u w q / = =  with subscripts denoting derivatives.  The corner solutions are either, full-
time off-farm wage employment or full-time individual farming.  The optimality condition 
for full-time off-farm wage employment is:  w q F l <  at l
F=0 and the optimality condition for 
full-time individual farming is:  w q F l >  at l
W=0.  Under the perfect market assumption, in 
equilibrium, labor supply is: l
S=l
F+l
W and farm labor use at market wage, assuming interior 




In the case of interior solution, with time divided between wage employment and 
individual farming, as managerial ability increases the allocation of labor shifts towards 
individual farming, which follows from the assumptions that managerial ability increases the 
marginal product of labor in individual farming, and that the return to managerial ability in 
wage employment, outside one’s own farm (business) is small (see e.g., Hallagan, 1978; 
Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Benjamin, 1998; Rizov and Swinnen, 2004).  More specifically, 
managerial ability contributes directly to increasing output for given amount of labor (and 
capital), and also increases the optimal amounts of labor (and capital) applied on-farm.  Thus 
managerial ability contributes to higher earnings in individual farming both directly and 
indirectly.  However, due to specificity of human capital characteristics such as education and 
experience positively affecting both managerial ability and off-farm wage opportunities there 
will be a trade off so that if returns to labor in off-farm wage employment increase more than 
                                                 
 
(1993) offer an analysis on how credit constraints impact on saving and investment decisions of rural 
households.  
8 Efficient allocation of productive resources and hence separability of production decisions and consumption 
preferences only requires that n-1 markets be perfect, where n is the number of production factors (de Janvry, 
Fafchamps, and Sadoulet, 1991; Gavian and Fafchamps, 1996).  Thus non-tradability of managerial ability 
should not prevent efficient allocation where factor markets are perfect.    10
in farming, labor use in individual farms will decline if labor markets are perfect (Soon, 
1987; Yang, 1997; Rizov and Swinnen, 2004). 
However, transition is characterized by significant market imperfections introducing 
substantial risk and uncertainty in the economy.  It is shown by number of studies that risk 
importantly impacts on labor allocation decisions (e.g., Block and Heineke, 1973; Barrett, 
1996).
9  Under price uncertainty Barrett (1996) shows that there is a gap between the 
marginal value product of farm household labor and the wage rate which is proportional to 
the covariance of marginal income, vy and output price, p, i.e.,  F l q Cov(vy,p)=E[vy(w-µ F l q )], 
where v(.) is indirect utility function and µ=E[p].
10  Analysis of this relationship, under the 
assumptions that farm households are income-risk averse and that the staple food is normal 
good, yields: (i) if the household is net seller of foot it will underemploy labor, and (ii) if the 
household is net buyer of foot it will overemploy labor.  These results are in line with 
findings of Bezemer (2004) for TEs.  
Thus, when markets are incomplete, or household and hired labor are not perfect 
substitutes in production, or farmers are risk averse and risks are high, household’s on- and 
off-farm labor allocation decisions will not be independent any more.  The amount of labor 
used will depend on household’s preferences, assets (technology), size and composition.   
Then it may be optimal for the household to allocate more labor on-farm than the amount 
where  w q F l = .  The wage that balances labor supply and demand under such circumstances 
is defined as shadow wage, w*.  The allocation of household labor to different income-
generating activities will depend through w* on total household labor, l
T, unearned income, 
y
N, and productive assets, a (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 1999; Rizov and Swinnen, 2004).  
                                                 
9 See also Bezemer (2004) for an analysis of the impact of risk on the behavior of agricultural enterprises in 
TEs.  
10 Epstein (1975) shows that using u(.), a variable indirect utility function, v(.) can be formulated by duality 
which is homogenous of degree zero in p
S, p
N, y
T and thus invariant to unit of measurement.  After normalizing   11
Then a reduced form farm labor use equation can be estimated by replacing w* with a 
function of the household’s endowments.  
The comparison of the settings with and without perfect markets yields a number of 
testable hypotheses.  First, if markets are perfect and w*=w, labor use in each income-
generating activity should depend only on prices and abilities in that activity, not on 
household assets and household size and composition.  Second, if markets are perfect, 
household assets, a, should only have an income effect on household labor supply, and both a 
and the unearned income, y
N should have no impact on the farm labor use.  In contrast, if 
capital and labor markets are incomplete, a and y
N may substantially raise returns to farm 
labor and hence induce more household farm labor use (e.g., Strauss, 1986; Ahituv and 
Kimhi, 2002; Dessing, 2002).   
 
4  Estimation methodology and variables 
Labor use estimation 
In the Hungarian sample 143 households or 9 percent report that none of their work time is 
allocated to individual farming.  The dependent variable is thus censored.  In principle, 
households that allocate some labor to individual farming may be systematically different in 
terms of unobservable characteristics from those households that do not.  Predictions of the 
farm labor use based on estimates obtained only from a sample of households that allocate 
labor to individual farming may be bias due to sample attrition.   
Given that OLS estimates of labor allocation may be biased and inconsistent if not 
corrected for this selection bias, a two-stage (TS) model is applied (Heckman, 1976, 1979).
11  
First, probabilities of selection into individual farming are estimated (probit equation) in 
                                                 
 
prices and income by p
N, v(l




N.  It is also assumed that the household 
exhibits Arrow-Pratt income risk aversion such that vyy<0.   12
order to obtain inverse Mills’ ratios (λ).  Second, the farm labor use is estimated.  The 
selection of households into farming can be modeled as:  
Z = α X + ν,            ( 1 )  
where Z = 1 if the household allocates some labor to farming and Z = 0 otherwise.  X is a 
vector of exogenous explanatory variables.  Each farming household has the (log-linear) 
labor use equation: 
Y = β X + ξ,            ( 2 )  
where Y measures labor use.  Given that ν, ξ ~ N(0,σ
2) with correlation ρ, equation (2) can be 
estimated as: 
E [Y | Z = 1] = β X + ρ σξ λν + ω,         ( 3 )  
where λν=φ (α X) /Φ (α X), and φ and Φ are the standard normal pdf and CDF, respectively, 
for the farming households.  Farm labor use is thus estimated including λ as an explanatory 
variable.  If λ is significant, then the censored sample (i.e., farming households only) is 
biased and TS model must be used with λ correcting for the bias.  Otherwise, the OLS 
estimator is appropriate.  
 
Discrete choice analysis 
We consider the three choices faced by the household as discussed in the conceptual model, 
full-time wage employment, part-time individual farming, and full-time individual farming.  
The most used estimation technique of multiple discrete choice dependent variables is the 
                                                 
 
11 Tobit model is an alternative to the TS model.  For comparison, we have estimated a Tobit model, however, 
the likelihood ratio test suggested that the TS model should be preferred (Greene, 1997).    13
multinomial logit (ML) model (McFadden, 1974, 1984).
12  An important assumption with the 
ML is that error terms are independently and identically distributed (iid).   
If the three choices, j are recorded in the dependent variable Z, and the vector of 
explanatory variables is X, we can estimate a set of coefficients β
(j), j=1,2,3 corresponding to 
each choice: 



















.         ( 4 )  
To identify the model, β
(1) is set equal to zero.  Thus, the remaining coefficients β
(2) and β
(3) 
measure the change relative to the Z=1 choice.  Then equations (4) become: 
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In order to compare outcomes, we can normalize on any other choice probability as 
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        ( 7 )  
From the independence of disturbances assumption, it follows that the odds ratio 
P
(j)/P
(k) does not depend on the other choices.
13   
                                                 
12 An alternative to the ML logit model is the ordered logit (and probit) model if we consider the household 
choices unambiguously ordered.  In such case there is extra information in the data that can be exploited.  We 
have estimated an ordered logit model and found that results are similar to the reported in the paper. 
13 However, the independence of choices is not always the case.  Hausman and McFadden (1984) suggest a test 
of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).  We have applied this Hausman-type test in our estimations 
and found that IIA assumption did hold.    14
 
Variables 
Following our conceptual model and estimation methodology outlined in previous sections 
we specify two dependent variables, a continuous farm labor use variable and a discrete 
choice variable with three alternatives.  The farm labor use is measured by the log of working 
days, in a typical year, allocated in individual farming.
14  The categorical dependent variable 
representing the three household choices equals one when no household member allocates 
labor to individual farming and all members in working age work for wages; it equals two if 
household members allocate labor to both individual farming and wage employment; the 
third choice is when household members work only on their individual farms full-time.  
In selecting explanatory variables we follow the results from the conceptual model.  
Since the shadow cost of labor, w* is not observable, we use in the regressions variables 
measuring factors that influence total labor use if markets are imperfect, i.e., household size 
and composition, unearned income, and physical-capital assets.  Thus, the explanatory 
variables used measure both supply and demand characteristics including household human 
capital and physical capital endowments and socio-economic environment characteristics.  
Human capital characteristics of the household such as average age (AGE) and 
education (EDU) of adult household members are measures of life-cycle effects, 
entrepreneurial motivation and managerial ability.  To account for nonlinear effects on farm 
labor use, the squared terms of these variables (AGE2 and EDU2) are also included.  A 
background variable (RURAL) measuring the rural experience of the household and its 
preferences for farming is used for identification in the two-stage model.  This is a dummy 
variable, which equals one if the household has always lived in rural areas and zero 
otherwise.     15
The total number of adult household members (ADULTS) includes both members in 
working (20-60 years) age and members in non-working age.  The coefficient of the variable 
representing the category of household members in working age (WORKMEM) as a share of 
ADULTS  indicates the efficiency of that category, relative to the excluded category of 
younger and older household members.  Household assets are measured by the total own land 
(LAND), the total equivalent number of machinery owned (MACHIN), and the total number 
of buildings owned (BUILD).
15  The unearned income (NINCOME) represents two 
categories of income: pensions/social payments (PENSION) and rental income.  Under 
standard assumptions, these variables are expected to have a negative effect on the household 
labor supply.   
The share of food expenditures, including food consumed on-farm, in total household 
expenditures (FOODSH) is used to control for the effect of price risk and household risk 
aversion.  According to our conceptual model a higher values of FOODSH should be 
associated with more household labor allocated to farming.  
Regional fixed effects at the NUTS-II classification level (see section 2) are included 
to control for (demand-side) location-specific changes in natural and economic environment.  
Table 2 provides definitions and summary statistics of the variables used in regressions.  
- Table 2 here - 
 
                                                 
 
14 Labor hiring is very rare - only 7 farms from the total sample hire one or more full-time workers, and only 85 
farms hire labor at all, most often for only 1-2 man-months.   
15 During the period of analysis sales markets for farm assets were missing or ill functioning and the main farm 
assets owned by households were obtained as a result of privatization and land reform, therefore they could 
safely be considered exogenous.  Furthermore, in the estimations I performed a number of robustness tests by 
stepwise excluding potentially endogenous explanatory variables.  These tests confirmed that the selected 
explanatory variables are appropriate and the results reported here are robust to various restricted specifications.  
Results of these additional regressions can be obtained from the author.   16
5 Estimation  results 
Estimation results from both the TS (Heckman) model and the ML model are reported in 
table 3 and table 4, respectively.  We discuss first the results associated with the farm labor 
use estimation.  The comparison of one-stage Tobit model results with the TS model results 
suggest that the decision to undertake individual farming is different from the decision of 
labor use in that activity, given participation.  The likelihood ratio test
16 is well above the χ
2 
critical value and shows that households are actually inhibited to engage in individual 
farming.  This test result can also be seen as consistent with the presence of threshold effects 
created by fixed costs, associated with the choice of this income-generating activity that 
households have to incur up front.   
 
- Table 3 - 
Human capital variables play an important role.  Age does positively affect the 
decision to allocate labor to individual farming up to about 66 years.  Past this age the effect 
is negative.  Conditional on having become a farmer, age positively affects the amount of 
labor used in farming.  Education also has a significant positive impact on both the decision 
to allocate labor to farming and the amount of labor used on the individual farm.  This effect 
becomes negative at about 8 years of schooling indicating that higher general education 
provides incentives for households to opt out of individul farming.  The possibility of 
households to do so could be considered an indirect evidence for relative competitiveness of 
the labor market.  
Household size is only a significant positive determinant of the amount of labor used 
on the individual farm but does not affect the decision of allocating labor to individual 
                                                 
16 Likelihood-ratio test statistics was computed as χ
2=2(lnL2S-lnLT)=2(-2011.6+2215.6)=408.0, where lnL2S and 
lnLT stand for the log-likelihood of the two-stage model and Tobit model, respectively.  This comparison 
suggests that the two-stage model should be preferred.    17
farming.  This result provides evidence against the perfect labor market assumption.  If the 
labor market was complete, production decisions should have been separable from household 
characteristics affecting labor supply (Benjamin, 1992).  The fact, however, that the decision 
to allocate labor to farming is independent of household composition implies only moderate 
(demand-side) labor market imperfections, which can also be explained by the small scale of 
individual farm operations, limited by forces other than the labor market (Feder, 1985).  
Ownership of farm-capital assets such as land, machinery and buildings affects 
positively both the decision to engage in individual farming and the amount of labor allocated 
on-farm.  Effects are similar in both the selection and allocation equations.  These results are 
again consistent with the imperfect factor market hypothesis and the presence of threshold 
effects.  Households that do not own capital assets are reluctant to engage in farming if 
markets for capital rental and sales are unreliable and incomplete.
17  In this context, 
ownership of capital assets can be treated as sunk cost required for starting up an individual 
farm (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993).  
The unearned-income variable has negative impact on the decision to allocate labor to 
individual farming.  This possibly implies that leisure is a normal good as commonly 
assumed.  In contrast, the impact of additional unearned income, as well as the share of 
pensions, on the amount of labor used on the individual farm is positive and significant 
indicating imperfect credit market.  Thus, availability of liquid assets can relax the capital 
constraints of the farming households (e.g., de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001; Rizov et al, 
2001).
18   
                                                 
 
17 The effect of land owned is particularly strong in the selection equation but diminishes once the selection 
decision is taken.  A possible explanation is that land rental market in Hungary is relatively complete and the 
growth of individual farms through leasing in land is feasible (Rizov and Mathijs, 2003).  
18 Swinnen and Gow (1999) provide an overview on credit constraints in transition agriculture and their 
implications for credit programs and government policies.   18
Interestingly, households that spend larger share of their total expenditures on food 
allocate and use more labor in farming.  This result supports the hypothesis that the food 
security considerations are important and that price risk and risk aversion do impact on 
household factor allocation decisions during transition (Bezemer, 2004). 
Regional effects are important and consistent with the characterization of the regions 
in Hungary.  These effects, on both labor allocation to and labor use in individual farming are 
most substantial in the agricultural regions, South and North Plain, as well as in the 
economically stagnated region of North Hungary, where formal-sector employment 
opportunities are most limited.  
Next, we analyze determinants of the decision to become a full-time individual farmer 
compared to the decisions to allocate only a proportion of household labor to individual 
farming or not to engage in farming at all.  We use a discrete-choice dependent variable with 
three categories and estimate a ML model as described in section 4.  The results are reported 
in table 4.  In this analysis we cast additional light on the issue of diversification versus 
specialization of rural households and the factors affecting the decision.   
- Table 4 - 
Interestingly, the coefficients have the same signs and similar magnitudes as in the 
first-stage selection equation of the TS model.  Column 1 examines the probability of being a 
part-time farmer relative to full-time wage employment.  Part-time farmers group represents 
the largest proportion of the sample (85 percent) and is of particular interest because under 
this alternative households diversify their sources of income as opposed to the other two 
alternatives where households specialize either in full-time individual farming or are full-time 
wage employees.   
Human capital variables are important determinants of the part-time-farming choice 
and the directions of the effects are the same as in the TS model.  However, the turning point   19
in the effect of age here is lower, at about 59 years; past this age both employment 
opportunities and the motivation to undertake individual farming diminish.  The positive 
coefficient of education changes sign at a higher level of about 10 years of schooling.   
Clearly, most likely to become part-time farmers are households with moderately high 
education.  In addition, part-time farmers also have relevant experience gathered through 
permanently residing in rural areas.  The effects of physical capital and finance variables and 
of the regional differences are very similar to the results obtained in the first-stage selection 
equation of the TS model.   
In column 2, the determinants of the odds of becoming a full-time farmer, relative to 
being a full-time wage employee are reported.  To make comparisons with the part-time 
individual farming choice, we must compare the coefficients in column 2 to the 
corresponding coefficients in column 1.  Doing so indicates that the human capital variables 
such as age and education are less important in determining who becomes a full-time 
individual farmer, compared with the choice of part-time farming.  However, physical capital 
and finance variables play here a more important role as both the magnitude and the 
significance of coefficients increase.  The coefficient of unearned income has become 
positive and significant indicating that credit constraints inhibit farmers to specialize.   
Interestingly, food security considerations are of less importance to full-time individual 
farmers, compared with part-time farmers.   
By and large, results obtained indicate the presence of threshold effects and the 
importance of household endowments in shifting resources to and operating a larger 
individual farm.  It seems that important differences between the part-time farmers and the 
full-time farmers lie in the human capital characteristics.  Part-time farmers are in general 
younger and possess better general education.  Another noteworthy result is that credit   20
constraints and food security considerations are important determinants of the choice of part-
time farming versus full-time farming.   
 
6  Conclusion and policy implications 
In this paper a conceptual model of the allocation of household labor between individual 
farming and off-farm wage employment in the context of TEs is developed.  The analysis is 
motivated by the fact that individual farming, most often part-time, is commonly observed in 
a number of TEs and specifically in Hungary.  This situation raises the question if such (part-
time) individual farming is a result of optimal resource allocation that can secure returns 
required to sustain investment and offer long-term development prospects or it is due to 
market imperfections and lack of opportunities elsewhere.  The model explicitly accounts for 
the role of observable and unobservable factors such as capital endowments and managerial 
ability in the allocation of household labor.  The analysis is conditioned on the status of the 
factor markets such that in the case of perfect markets household endowments should not 
affect allocation decisions.   
Estimation results from both two-stage (Heckman) and discrete choice multinomial 
logit models indicate that the human capital characteristics such as age and education 
positively affecting managerial ability of rural households and thus households’ allocation of 
labor to individual farming.  However, at some relatively high level, about 8 years, of 
schooling the contribution of education to off-farm wages is more important.  Furthermore, 
the probability of engaging in individual farming declines at higher ages consistent with the 
life cycle hypothesis.  
The result that labor allocation is largely invariant to household size and composition 
taken together with the effects of human capital provide evidence for moderate 
competitiveness of the labor market in Hungary during the period of analysis.  This finding is   21
important for a number of agricultural transition and rural development policies relying on 
flexibility of labor market as an adjustment mechanism.  With respect to other factor markets, 
specifically those for farm assets and credit, the results show that there are still important 
imperfections as demonstrated by the significant positive relationships between the factor 
endowments and the labor allocation of rural households.   
Clearly, “pull” and “push” factors induce rural households to turn to individual 
farming and/or off-farm wage employment.  In an environment of imperfect markets 
characterizing TEs, households engage in individual farming if endowed with sufficient 
productive resources.  However, if higher-return and less risky income generating 
opportunities exist in wage employment, more household labor will be diverted off-farm.  
Food security considerations related to the high price risk during transition is another factor 
affecting the choice of part-time farming versus full-time wage employment.  
Our analysis suggests that (i) improving the functioning of capital asset, insurance, 
and credit markets; (ii) investing in human capital, relevant to managing farm business; and 
(iii) taking steps to help improve the asset endowments and food security of the poorer 
segments of the rural population, would enable rural households to allocate resources in 
various activities according to their comparative advantage.  Such measures would allow 
households to make full use of the opportunities emerging with the market liberalization, 
privatization and restructuring of agriculture in TEs while in the same time would lead to an 
optimal diversification at community level.   
The implications of the analysis for introducing various rural development measures 
in the NMS and their integration into CAP are important.  The support redistribution resulting 
from the CAP reforms would affect farming populations in the NMS in a major way.   
Specifically, capital constrained farmers by benefiting from commodity production support 
would be able to specialize in farming related activities and extend their operations.  In the   22
same time, a significant proportion of the part-time farming and underemployed rural 
households by facing more stable consumer prices and higher food security are likely to leave 
the sector and start up into non-agricultural entrepreneurial activities or wage employment.  
Structural funds initiatives could further stimulate this process and contribute to rural 
community development and the welfare of rural households.    23
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Table 1: Household characteristics and economic activities 
 
Household labor allocation choices   






Number 143  1338  137 
Percent 8.8  82.7  8.5 
Age 52.8  49.7  54.9 
Education 8.8  9.2  8.8 
Members (16-60)  1.8  2.0  1.8 
Annual net income, HUF  549,330  682,528  614,117 
Note: Data do not contain income information for each individual household member.  Annual net income is 
calculated on the bases of total household expenditures ($1~HUF180).  
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EDU is average number of years of 








RURAL is a dummy variable equal 
to one if household resided always 







ADULTS is total number of adult 








WORKMEM is share of household 
















MACHINS is total equivalent 


























PENSION is share of pensions and 
social payments in the total 







FOODSH is share of food 








(1) Weighted index of 9 items with following weights: truck=1, tractor=1, cultivator=0.5, combine=2, feed 
combine=2, sowing machine=1, spraying equipment=1, milk processor=1, grape press=0.5.   
(2) Index of 6 buildings items: cattle stables, pig houses, poultry houses, sheep shelters, storage facilities, and 
fixed greenhouses.   
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Table 3: Estimation of labor use in individual farming 
 
Dependent variable: Log of the work days allocated to individual farming per year 
Selection (1)  Allocation (2)   
Variables 
Coefficient (z)  Coefficient (z) 
AGE 0.048 (3.75) **  0.017 (3.17)  ** 
AGE2 (10
-2) -0.036 (5.21) **  -0.001 (0.91)   
EDU 0.133 (3.69) **  0.059 (3.11)  ** 
EDU2 (10
-1) -0.085 (2.82) **  -0.037 (4.42)  ** 
RURAL 0.052 (3.23) **  -   
ADULTS (log)  0.014 (0.53)   0.502 (9.21)  ** 
WORKMEM (16-60)   0.083 (1.43)   0.168 (3.99)  ** 
LAND (log+1)  0.328 (3.38) **  0.156 (6.22)  ** 
MACHINS (log+1)  0.176 (2.79) **  0.164 (5.56)  ** 
BUILDS (log+1)  0.045 (1.03)   0.037 (2.15)  * 
NINCOME (log+1)  -0.035 (3.77) **  0.040 (2.95)  ** 
PENSION 0.147 (1.38)   0.317 (4.23)  ** 
FOODSH 0.273 (2.97) **  0.258 (3.77)  ** 
North Transdanubia  -0.017 (0.57)   -0.012 (0.30)   
West Transdanubia  0.101 (1.31)   0.017 (0.35)   
South Transdanubia  0.129 (1.96) *  0.147 (3.04)  ** 
South Plain  0.319 (4.53) **  0.231 (5.56)  ** 
North Plain  0.317 (4.55) **  0.462 (9.03)  ** 
North Hungary  0.220 (2.92) **  0.396 (7.74)  ** 
Intercept -0.585 (1.51)   3.316 (4.04)  ** 
λ     0.744 (4.51)  ** 
Log-likelihood -2011.63
Number of observations   1395
Note: ** and * indicate that the effect of a variable is significant at the 1or 5 percent level, respectively.  
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Table 4: Discrete choice analysis of labor allocation 
 
Dependent variable: Wage employment, part-time farming, full-time individual farming 
Part-time farming (1)  Full-time farming (2)   
Variables 
Coefficient (z)  Coefficient (z) 
AGE 0.068 (3.93) **  0.036 (1.82)   
AGE2 (10
-2) -0.058 (4.24) **  -0.028 (1.58)   
EDU 0.179 (3.24) **  0.094 (3.11)  ** 
EDU2 (10
-1) -0.088 (2.69) **  -0.062 (2.39)  * 
RURAL 0.023 (4.07) **  0.095 (5.70)  ** 
ADULTS (log)  0.015 (1.17)   0.047 (1.29)   
WORKMEM (16-60)   0.039 (1.60)   0.068 (1.44)   
LAND (log+1)  0.167 (3.96) **  0.225 (4.51)  ** 
MACHINS (log+1)  0.142 (2.70) **  0.188 (3.04)  ** 
BUILDS (log+1)  0.042 (1.04)   0.061 (1.80)   
NINCOME (log+1)  -0.067 (2.79) **  0.037 (2.06)  * 
PENSION 0.202 (1.70)   0.160 (1.47)   
FOODSH 0.289 (2.76) **  0.119 (1.29)   
North Transdanubia  0.078 (0.99)   -0.080 (1.14)   
West Transdanubia  0.086 (1.22)   0.109 (2.12)  * 
South Transdanubia  0.112 (2.07) *  0.172 (3.33)  ** 
South Plain  0.299 (4.03) **  0.275 (4.81)  ** 
North Plain  0.298 (4.41) **  0.251 (5.07)  ** 
North Hungary  0.184 (3.95) **  0.247 (3.64)  ** 
Intercept -0.812 (2.09) *  -1.069 (2.35)  * 
Pseudo R
2       32.52
Log-likelihood -2144.66
Number of observations   1395
Note: The reference choice is full-time wage employment. ** and * indicate that the effect of a variable is 
significant at the 1or 5 percent level, respectively.  
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